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In this paper, we strive to better understand how household investment is affected by par-
ticipation in migration in rural China. After we describe investment patterns across different
regions of rural China, we use a theoretical model to describe a relationship between migration
and investment and to generate hypotheses about the relationship consistent with our descrip-
tive ﬁndings. We test the hypotheses using household data collected in rural China in 2000 and
ﬁnd that in poorer areas migration increases consumptive investment by nearly 20 percent. We
ﬁnd no evidence of a link between migration and productive investment.
JEL Codes: D1, J6, O1Household Investment through Migration in Rural China
As an important component in both the China’s growth and poverty programs, leaders in
China have demanded ofﬁcials in rural areas increase investment (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). To
pursue goals related to higher growth and investment, ofﬁcials have recently shifted their attention
to the private sector. Although early in reforms the government played the dominant role in invest-
ment, the private sector has risen in importance as the ﬁscal strength of government entities across
China has deteriorated, particularly in poor areas (Feder et al., 1992). Indeed, China’s poverty
policy and many international poverty programs have begun to focus on helping poor families
generate their own investments to raise their welfare levels and accelerate growth (World Bank,
2001).
Although China’s leaders and outside donor agencies seem to agree that private investment is
necessary in rural China, little research has focused on understanding the nature of private invest-
ments across China during the past decade. Research by Fan et al. (2002) and Park et al. (1998)
carefully document investments and measures the consequences of investments, but their work fo-
cuses solely on public investments. Liu et al. (2002) examine the determinants of rural household
investment, but only consider whether or not households made an investment, and focus on only
one relatively well-off province, Jiangsu. Based on the available research, it is clear that there must
be considerable private investment. However, little is known about the level of investments, where
they are taking place, and what types of investments households are making.
Moreover, if little is known about the contours of private investment over time and across
space, less is known about how households ﬁnance their investments, particularly in poor areas.
In richer areas, rising wealth means farmers frequently are frequently in a position to self-ﬁnance
their investments. As rural regions along the coast and around inland cities have prospered, banks
gradually have begun to offer to credit to rural enterprises (Park et al., 2003). Entrepreneurs in
these areas also have turned to informal sources of borrowing as sources of investment ﬁnance.
In contrast, farmers in poorer areas have neither ready access to self-ﬁnancing, by virtue of their
relative poverty, nor do they have access to formal lending, because of credit rationing by lending
institutions.
1Without access to more traditional sources of credit, it is possible that farmers in poor ar-
eas could turn to migration as a way to ﬁnance new investments. In other parts of the world,
researchers have studied the effect of migration and remittances on household investments in the
source community (e.g. Durand et al., 1996; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2001). With the enormous
increase in out migration from rural areas, a great deal of it coming from poorer areas (deBrauw
et al., 2002), it seems a logical place to consider as a source of investment capital for poor, ru-
ral households. Zhao (2002), Bai (2001) and Murphy (1999) have all explored the link between
migration and source community investment in rural China. Unfortunately, the works of Bai and
Murphy are largely descriptive. Although Zhao’s multivariate analysis ﬁnds a positive relationship
between migration and investment, her data set has no time dimension, so she is unable to account
for unobserved heterogeneity that could affect the results.
The overall goal of this paper is to better understand how household investment is affected
by participation in migration in rural China. To meet this goal, we have three speciﬁc objectives.
First, we will document investment patterns and identify the ways that migration is associated with
private investment. Second, we identify the linkages by which the household’s decision to migrate
can facilitate investment. The theoretical model generates several empirically testable hypotheses;
of these, we speciﬁcally examine the ones that explore how and under what conditions migration
leads to increases of household investments. Third, we empirically test the hypotheses in order to
identify if migration is one of the mechanisms by which rural households increase investment. To
address concerns of possible endogeneity between migration and investment, we use retrospective
panel data using household ﬁxed effects and instrumental variables (IV) approaches.
To meet our objectives, the paper proceeds as follows. First, we introduce the data set that
will be used for analysis. Next, we use our data to describe the investment behavior of rural
households during the late 1990s, the nature of their participation in migration and the correla-
tions between migration and investment. Since the need for rural households to rely on migration
to ﬁnance their investments may depend on the level of wealth in the region and the presence
or absence of alternative ﬁnancial intermediaries, our discussion examines the relationships for
households that live in rich and poor areas. In the third section, we develop a theoretical model
2of migration and investment that takes into account institutional features of rural China, a model
extending the framework established in the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) literature
(Stark, 1991). In the ﬁnal two sections, we empirically test the hypotheses generated by the model,
report on the results and draw conclusions.
1 Data
The data for this study were collected by one of the authors in a randomly selected, nearly nation-
ally representative sample of 60 villages in 6 provinces of rural China. The provinces are Hebei,
Liaoning, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Hubei and Sichuan. To ensure broad coverage within each province,
one county was randomly selected from within each income quintile for the province, as measured
by the gross value of industrial output. Two villages were randomly selected within each county.
The survey teams used village rosters and a census of households not included in the village’s list
of households to randomly choose the twenty households; both households with their residency
permits (hukou) in the village and those without. The household survey gathered detailed informa-
tion on member demographics, wealth, agricultural production, non-farm activities and investment
over time. A total of 1199 households were surveyed.
Severalsectionsofthehouseholdsurveyweredesignedtocollectcomprehensiveinformation
aboutproduction-andconsumption-orientedinvestments. Allofthehouseholdsinthesamplewere
asked a comprehensive set of questions about investments they may have made over the past ten
to twenty years. Investments were classiﬁed as either productive or consumptive, categories we
deﬁne in more detail in the next section. Since we have data on all the household’s investments
and purchases made since 1995, we can create both an annual investment variable and a variable
that measures total investment since 1995, which we call cumulative investment.
Another section of the survey focused on current and past migration experiences of all house-
hold members and children of the household head. Enumerators questioned all household mem-
bers about their participation in off-farm work, the location of their employment (local or not),
their wages, and if identiﬁed as a migrant, any remittances sent back to the household by migrants
3in 2000.1 In addition, enumerators completed a twenty-year employment history form for each
household member and each child of the household head in roughly half of the households (610
out of 1199). For each year between 1981 and 2000, the form gathered information on the main
type of off-farm work performed (if any), the place of residence while working (at home or outside
the village– i.e. local or migrant), the location of employment, whether or not the individual was
self-employed and the level of involvement in farming. We deﬁne migrants as any individual who
had not formally split from the household, worked off-farm or lived outside of the household while
working. We can then further identify return migrants as household members who had migrated
in the past but subsequently returned to the household.2
2 Investment and Migration
In this section, we primarily describe patterns of investment and migration and the linkages be-
tween them. However, investments are only one way that households spend money, and migration
is only one way that households might ﬁnance investment. The characteristics of some parts of
China might encourage investment, whereas the characteristics of other areas might discourage
investment. Consequently, before we begin to examine migration’s role in providing a substitute
for credit, we should describe the environment in which rural households live in more detail.
As in other countries, economic growth in China’s rural economy has led to a rapid increase
in the demand for credit (Shen, 1999). In some richer areas, rural banks have been willing to
make loans, providing households with opportunities for investment (Park et al., 2003). Even if
banks are unwilling or unable to provide credit, in many areas households borrow from informal
sources of credit, such as moneylenders or other informal ﬁnancial intermediaries. In richer areas,
households are sometimes wealthy enough to invest substantially using their own funds.
1For the survey year itself, 2000, migrants were identiﬁed as follows. All household members were ﬁrst divided
into two groups, those who lived outside the household three or more months and the children of the household head
who had not formally left the household to set up their own (fen jia), but were not present for more than two months
per year. Migrants were identiﬁed in the former group as people who held an off-farm job outside the village, and
did not live at home while doing the job. In the latter group, migrants were identiﬁed as the children who left the
household for employment, rather than to go to school or another reason not related to employment.
2When using these data, information on past migration and return migration activity, and any other time varying
information, the paper will refer to the 610 households in the employment history sample.
4Unfortunately, as in other less developed countries, in poor areas of China formal channels
of investment funding are not available (Shen, 1999). When most households are poor, by deﬁni-
tion households rarely have enough funds to self-ﬁnance and formal credit is almost impossible to
obtain. As in richer areas, when formal institutions do not exist, there are pressures to create infor-
mal lending institutions to alleviate constraints on investment (e.g. Aleem, 1990). For example, in
poorer parts of China households often rely on zero interest loans from relatives and close friends
(Park and Wang, 1999). While these types of loans are common throughout poor areas of China,
these types of loans almost exclusively are given to meet the needs of unexpected shocks and rarely
are provided to ﬁnance investments. In some areas microcredit schemes have appeared and offer
farmers a source of investment credit, but these programs are not very widespread (e.g. Park and
Ren, 2001). Hence, it is within the type of a setting that is characterized by relative poverty and the
absence of formal and informal sources of credit that migration has been discussed as a potential
source of capital for households in rural China (Bai, 2001; Zhao, 2002; Murphy, 1999; Rozelle et
al., 1999).
Data from our sample demonstrate that in 2000, credit markets were still relatively underde-
veloped in parts of rural China, especially in poor areas.3 Speciﬁcally, households in poor areas
both had trouble accessing funds from credit markets, and when they received loans, the amounts
were relatively small. For example, in poor areas, only 10 percent of households were able to
borrow from formal ﬁnancial intermediaries. Moreover, the average amount that they borrowed
was less than half the average amount borrowed from banks in richer areas. When running small
businesses, rural residents also had difﬁculties in gaining access to larger volumes of credit. Al-
though households in richer areas did not always have much more success in gaining access to
loans (the percentages did not vary that much, although the average size of the loan was higher
in richer areas), their ability to self ﬁnance varied sharply. For example, when households relied
solely on their own funds to start up businesses, the average amount of start-up capital was two
and a half times higher in richer areas than poorer areas (10,000 versus 4,000 yuan).4 The size of
loans for investments from informal sources (mostly relatives and friends) was also signiﬁcantly
3See subsection below for our deﬁnitions of rich and poor areas.
4Furthermore, more household businesses are located in rich areas than in poorer areas.
5higher in richer areas.
Because rich and poor areas differ in their access to funds, through either ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries or self-ﬁnancing, one might expect that households have different propensities to turn
to alternative ﬁnance mechanisms in rich and poor areas. Therefore, in our subsequent analyses
we will allow the interaction of migration and investment to differ by the level of wealth of the
region in which the household resides. In addition, the division of the sample into rich and poor
areas might be useful when examining the types of investments. For example, it is possible that
the demand for loans for businesses are higher in richer areas than poorer ones, given the higher
probability of a household being able to ﬁnd business-oriented investments with sufﬁciently high
returns.
2.1 Investments in Rural China
Regardless of the source of investment capital, households in rural China have been making invest-
ments in much more than just agriculture. In fact, they make a wide variety of investments that we
categorize as productive or consumptive investments. Productive investments can be characterized
as investments in agricultural or non-agricultural activities that enhance the income-earning enter-
prises of the household. Agricultural investments include improvements in agricultural land pro-
ductivity, purchases of agricultural capital goods and commercial agricultural investments. Land-
enhancing investments include land improvements meant to increase yields in grains and legumes.
Agricultural capital goods include purchases of tractors, plows or bullocks used in agricultural pro-
duction. Commercial agricultural investments include investments in orchards, ﬁshponds, forests
and others that lead to shifts in land use and allow farmers to produce higher-valued, specialty
crops. All other enterprises in which households are engaged in running are considered non-farm
businesses. In rural China such enterprises take on many forms, ranging from small village stores
to relatively large manufacturing facilities.
We also measure household investment in consumption-side, or consumptive, activities.
These investments directly improve the quality of life for members of the household, rather than
helping them raise their income through increased production. The investments included in this
6category are investments in housing and durable goods that cost more than 500 yuan.5 In the re-
mainder of our paper, we mainly use the data we have on the amount invested by households since
1995.6
Although not all households invest every year, many households in our sample undertake
some kind of productive investment between 1995 and 2000. The average total amount invested
ranged from 3669 yuan in 1995 to 9229 yuan in 2000 (Table 1). The median investment also
has been increasing, indicating that over time household investments have been getting larger.
In any given year, between 17 and 26 percent of households made a productive investment. By
taking the average size of investment and multiplying by the proportion of households that made
investments we can roughly approximate the growth rate of productive investment in rural China
during the 1990s. For example, between 1998 and 1999, investment grew at about 10 percent per
year, whichisslightlyhighertheinvestmentgrowthratereportedintheChineseNationalStatistical
Yearbook for rural households (CNSB, 2000). While not every household made a productive
investment during the 5 year study period, a majority of them (61.5 percent) did (Table 2; row 4).
As the percentage of households making an investment grows, so does the cumulative productive
investment measure, increasing from 3669 yuan in 1995 to 12030 yuan in 2000 (row 1).
Depending on the availability of investment opportunities, household resources and prefer-
ences, households making investments might not choose to invest in production-side activities,
instead investing in housing or durable goods that improve their quality of life. Across all years,
consumptive investments not only occur more frequently than productive ones, but the average
5All nominal values in this paper have been normalized by the rural CPI to their value in 2000 (CNSB, 2000). The
ofﬁcial exchange rate in 2000 was approximately 8.27 yuan to the dollar.
6Although we have data on most categories of investment over longer periods of time, we choose to aggregate
investments since 1995 for two reasons. First, over a shorter time horizon it is less necessary to deal with the compli-
cations of depreciation. Moreover, since we did not track asset disposal, if we use fewer years of data, our total asset
base could contain more error. As it is, with only 5 years of investment data, we have evidence that our measurements
should be relatively accurate. Less than one percent of agricultural capital goods were sold or discarded in 2000,
indicating that if we are underestimating the amount of capital goods held by households in years prior to 2000, the
magnitude of that underestimation due to ignoring asset sales or disposal is fairly small. Additionally, in the entire
sample only ﬁve households have completely lost land on which they had made an investment since 1980. In other
cases in which households lost land on which they had invested, they received some form of compensation. Second,
and perhaps most importantly, the data set includes other information about the household that varies since 1995 or
1996, so we can create a retrospective panel on migration activity, investment, and other economic and demographic
aspects of the household.
7amount invested each year in consumptive investments is also larger (Table 1). Our data also show
that the size of consumptive investments in the late 1990s are driven by housing investments, which
is consistent with a description of rural investment in the 1980s (Feder et al., 1992).7
By any measure, since 1995 total investment (the sum of productive and consumptive invest-
ment) in rural China has been pervasive and growing (Table 2; rows 9-12). Given investment has
occurred, the median household in 2000 has invested over 8000 yuan in productive or consumptive
investments over the past ﬁve years (column 6, row 11). If we assume that the income per capita of
the median household with four members is 2000 yuan and constant (CNSB, 2000), it would have
had an investment rate of roughly 15%. Furthermore, our data show that most rural households in
China (83 percent) have undertaken some sort of investment. Hence, the rapid increase in assets
for a most households is consistent with the observed increasing standard of living in rural areas
over the late 1990s (about 5 percent per year annual increase in per capita rural incomes– CNSB,
2000). Some might ﬁnd the increase in living standards described here surprising, given the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis of 1997 and claims of economic stagnation in China by some researchers (Rawski,
2001).
2.2 Investment Differences across Space
While most households made investments during the 1990s, the size of cumulative investments
vary signiﬁcantly across the sample provinces and across counties within the provinces (Table 3).
We ﬁnd that rural households in Zhejiang Province, which is adjacent to Shanghai, have invested
more than households in other provinces. Total cumulative investment between 1995 and 2000
averaged around 50000 yuan in Zhejiang (column 2, row 1), almost double the average of the
other provinces (row 1, columns 2 and 3). Given that Zhejiang has the highest rural per-capita
income in China, the higher levels of investment in Zhejiang are not surprising (CNSB, 2000).
Within provinces, investments also differ signiﬁcantly by county, especially when we rank
them by wealth levels. To rank counties by wealth level, we used each county’s average gross value
of industrial output (GVIO), which was provided by China’s National Statistical Bureau to help
7Of housing investments, 77 percent have been new houses; the other 23 percent are additions or renovations. Only
renovations involving over 3000 yuan were enumerated.
8choose the sample. We then characterize the county in each province with the highest GVIO as
rich and label the others as poor. Across all provinces, the rich counties have average investment
levels that are roughly two and a half times higher than poorer counties (rows 2 and 3, column
1). The same patterns are found in Zhejiang and other sample provinces (columns 2 and 3). As
discussed previously, we are not surprised that richer areas have higher levels of investment than
poor areas. Households in richer areas may be better able to self-ﬁnance investment activities and
when access to credit is available, they may be able to borrow more from banks than households
in poor areas. We are interested, however, in knowing if migration affects household investment,
so we may have to look for different patterns across rich and poor areas.
2.3 Migration and Investment by Migrant Households
The rise in migration and remittances by rural households in China is well documented in the liter-
ature and is one of the fundamental forces of change affecting the rural economy in the late 1990s
(e.g. Knight and Song, 1999; Rozelle et al., 1999; Zhao, 1999). According to our employment
history data, migration accounted for the fastest growing proportion of the off-farm labor market
during the 1990s (de Brauw et al., 2002). From less than four percent of the rural labor force in
the early 1980s, by 1995 about 10 percent of the rural labor force worked as migrants and by 2000
almost 20 percent did (Table 4, columns 1 and 2). The share of the workforce entering migration
in rich areas is traditionally slightly higher than in poor areas (columns 3-6). Remittances from
migrants also rose with the outﬂow of labor from villages, reaching 9 percent of rural income in
2001 (Deininger et al., 2003). In our data, remittances account for about 5 percent of household
incomes across all households.
As migration has grown rapidly in recent years, the movement of labor back to the village
also has accelerated. Noted by a number of researchers in recent years (e.g., Murphy, 1999; Ma,
2001; Zhao, 2002), the ﬂow of migrants back to villages is thought to be a source of new energy
upon which rural communities can depend on for development. In our sample, the average migrant
returns to the village after approximately ﬁve years. While remittances are thought to be the main
way the ﬁnancial resources ﬂow back into the villages, during our ﬁeldwork we were told that in
9many cases migrants save substantial amounts of cash in the city and bring it back to the home
village only when they return to the village. Migration and return migration, at least in our sample,
occur with relatively similar frequencies in both rich and poor areas.
Although there is little empirical evidence linking migration and investment in China, several
researchers have investigated the relationship between migration and investment in other countries,
with somewhat conﬂicting ﬁndings. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) show that when about half
of a sample of Turkish migrants to Germany returned home, they became active entrepreneurs and
used savings earned abroad to ﬁnance their businesses. Durand et al. (1996) show that Mexican
migrants still in the US channel send remittances back to their home communities to be used for
investment, particularly for housing. In contrast, Taylor et al. (1996) and Mines and de Janvry
(1982), also writing about Mexican migrants, show that not all migrants make productive invest-
ments into their source communities.
From the household’s perspective, migration could affect investment either while the migrant
is away or after the migrant returns. While there may be differences in the ways that migrants and
returnmigrantsaffectinvestment, wedonotmakesuchadistinctioninthispaper. Inourtheoretical
model in the next section, we focus on the way that migration, in general, affects investment. In
doing so, we implicitly assume that the process of sending out migrants and their decision to
return to the source community are parts of a single process and our hypotheses do not distinguish
between the two phases of migration. In the descriptive work in this section and in the econometric
analysis in section 4 we specify two variables, the number of household members in the migrant
work force during each sample year (number of migrants) and the number of return migrants,
although we have no a priori expectation about which one will have a larger or smaller effect on
investment.
When we examine the relationship between migration and cumulative investment in 2000
in rich and poor areas, we ﬁnd that migrant households generally have higher average investment
levels than non-migrant ones (Table 5, column 1). In rich areas both households with migrants
and return migrants have total investment levels that are nearly 70 percent higher than non-migrant
households. In poor areas migrants also have total investment levels more than 20 percent higher.
10When looking at levels of investment among households groups by migration participation,
we ﬁnd a much different pattern for productive than consumptive investment (Table 5, column 2
and 3). On average, in both rich and poor areas migrant and return migrant households invest
much more in housing and durables than non-migrant households. The pattern for consumptive
investments is strikingly similar to the pattern for total investments. In contrast, there is no clear
pattern for productive investments. Return migrants appear to have higher average productive
investmentlevelsthannon-migrantonesinrichareas, andnon-migranthouseholdshavethehighest
productive investment levels in poor areas. From the our descriptive ﬁndings, then, it would appear
that if a positive relationship between migration and investment exists, it is between migration and
consumptive, rather than productive, investments.
Therefore, after examining differences between the point estimates of the mean investment
levels for migrant and non-migrant households, there is some reason to believe that households in
rural China may send out migrants to ﬁnance investments, especially consumptive ones. However,
the analysis has several drawbacks. The standard error of every point estimate is large, which calls
intoquestionthereliabilityofthedifferences.8 Wealsodonotpreciselyunderstandtherelationship
between migration and investment; in the next section, we pose a theoretical relationship between
the two. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are several other factors that may covary with
the migration and investment that obscure the relationship.
3 A Two Period Model of Migration and Investment
Although the descriptive analysis and observations from the literature indicate that investment lev-
els in China’s source communities are generally higher in migrant households than non-migrant
households, it does not indicate how migration affects household investment behavior. In fact, the
relationship between migration and investment may be complex. Although households ultimately
may achieve higher income (from remittances or from their migration-ﬁnanced investments), they
also face tradeoffs when deciding whether or not to include migration in the household develop-
8On the other hand, had we constructed the Table 5 with medians rather than means, we ﬁnd a similar pattern of
differences between migrant and non-migrant households.
11ment strategy. Migration, by deﬁnition, means that the household has less labor available for local
production, at least until the migrant returns. It also is possible that despite the correlation we
observe in the descriptive data, migration per se has little or no effect on investment. For example,
it may be that migrant households were originally wealthier (or are inherently more capable) and
so are able to invest more. It also may be that migrant households are at different points in their
life cycles than non-migrant households and are in better positions to ﬁnance investments.
In this section, we present a theoretical model that illustrates a mechanism by which migra-
tion can increase household income through investment. The model tries to account for the costs
of migration to the household and examine how the household’s wealth (or access to alternative
credit sources) affects the propensity of household’s to migrate as a way to ﬁnance investment. At
the end of the section, we generate empirically testable hypotheses regarding the linkages between
migration and investment that will be tested in the next section.
To begin, we assume that a household with speciﬁc characteristics X, a labor endowment
L, and a capital endowment K produces one good with its capital and labor using the production
technology f(K,L;X) in two time periods. The household gains utility from consumption in
each period according to it utility function, U(C1,C2), where Ci is consumption in period i, i =
1,2. The household is assumed to consume the same amount as it produces in value terms, so
consumption is equivalent to income.
Since we initially assume that there are no alternative sources of credit, migration is the only
mechanism the household can use to increase its consumption in period 2. Without access to credit
(or self ﬁnancing) the household can send out migrant labor, M, to produce remittances, R, in
period 1 to either add to its period 1 consumption or to invest and add to its capital stock that will
produce greater income (consumption) in period 2.9 Remittances, R, are a function of migration,
where R = g(M;Z), and Z represent other household factors that affect remittance behavior. For
simplicity, we assume that migration always produces remittances to the household. In period 1
the household can choose to either immediately consume the remittances or to invest a portion of
9Note that households also could save in period 1 in order to invest in period 2, or they could borrow and invest
in period 1, paying back the loan in period 2. Adding savings to the model does not add to our understanding of the
relationship between investment and migration, while it complicates the algebra signiﬁcantly. Therefore, savings are
not explicitly modeled. We relax the assumption by adding borrowing in a later part of this section.
12them, φ; 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, in capital goods that can be used in period 2.10 The currency equivalent of
capital in period 2, therefore, is K + φR if the household has sent out a migrant, and is K if they
have not. From the perspective of period 1, the relative output price in period 2 is expected to be
p2. Both functions, f(·) and g(·) are assumed to be concave, continuous, and twice differentiable.
The constraints faced by the household determine the key tradeoffs it faces in its maximiza-
tiondecision. Consumptioninperiod1isequaltothesumoftheamountproducedinthehousehold
and the portion of remittances that are consumed, so C1 = f(K,L − M;X) + (1 − φ)g(M;Z).
Consumption in period 2 is only the amount that the household produces, so C2 = p2f(K +
φg(M;Z),L;X). Therefore, if a migrant is sent out, the household’s consumption or income may
drop in period 1, due to the loss of labor in household production.11 This loss, however, can be
compensated for and possibly even entirely made up for by the immediate consumption of remit-
tances. Households that send out migrants and invest a portion of remittances in period 1 in a
productive (consumptive) investment will experience an increase in income (or consumption di-
rectly) in period 2 due to the increase in capital. Given these conditions, the household’s problem
is to maximize its utility by choosing the extent of its participation in migration, M, and the portion
of remittances, φ, that it will invest:
max
M,φ
U(f(K,L − M;X) + (1 − φ)g(M;Z),
p2f(K + φg(M;Z),L;X))
s.t. 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 (1)
To ensure an optimum, two ﬁrst-order conditions must be met. The household will send out mi-
10In our formulation, our capital good could be either used in production or for consumption. One could imagine
that the household either uses its production technology to produce income, or uses it to provide consumption services,
which could also be considered income. Essentially, we are assuming that the production technology is producing a
conglomerategoodthatisacombinationofaproduction-sideoutputandaservicefromtheconsumption-sidedurables,
which include housing. The assumption that housing or durables increases both consumption and income is commonly
used (e.g. Benjamin and Brandt, 2001).
11Implicitly, we assume that the household cannot replace the migrant’s labor by hiring labor. Although we return
to this assumption and examine it brieﬂy the empirical ﬁndings below, as stated in the paper’s introduction, testing this
proposition is beyond the scope of the paper.
13grant labor until:
UC1(−fL + (1 − φ
∗)gM) + UC2p2φ
∗fKgM = 0 (2)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and arguments of functions have been suppressed. Mi-
gration decreases the amount of the good produced by the household in period 1, and can increase
consumption in period 1 through remittances consumed, and consumption in period 2 through the
investment of remittances. Therefore, equation (2) shows that the household equates, in marginal
utility terms, the cost of migration in period 1 with the overall gain from migration in periods 1
and 2.12
Figure 1 illustrates the tradeoff between consumption in period 1 (C1) and period 2 (C2)
is created by migration. If a household does not participate in migration, its budget constraint is
Bn and the household can consume where its intertemporal indifference curve ICn is tangent to
the budget constraint. However, a household that participates in migration may be able to reach a
higher indifference curve as follows. If the household receives remittances from the migrant and
invests at least a portion of those remittances (e.g. φ > 0), its budget constraint may shift to Bm,
and may be able to reach indifference curve ICm. In order to reach the indifference curve ICm,
however, the household has to give up the difference in consumption in period 1 (Cn
1 − Cm
1 ) in
order to realize a higher consumption level in period 2 (Cm
2 − Cn
2).
The second ﬁrst-order condition that characterizes the solution to (1) implies that the house-
hold maximizes utility with respect to the fraction of remittances invested in capital in period 2.
Deﬁning µ as the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that the household consumes all of its re-
mittances in period 1 (corresponding to φ∗ = 0), the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal fraction
φ of remittances invested is:13
−UC1g(M
∗;Z) + UC2p2fKg(M
∗;Z) + µ = 0 (3)
12Themodeldescribes labor asacontinuousvariable, whichlikelyitisnot, sinceamigrantmust leavethehousehold
for a speciﬁed period of time.
13In analyzing this ﬁrst-order condition, we ignore the possibility that the household might still be capital con-
strained despite participation in migration (φ∗ = 1). Even if households are still capital constrained despite participa-
tion in migration, empirically we will observe an effect of migration on investment. In the context of this paper, which
seeks to test whether migration affects investment, this possibility is not empirically interesting.
14Equation (3) also equates a loss of consumption in period 1 and a gain in period 2. Given period
2’s expected prices, the household equates the marginal utility of consuming remittances in period
1 with the marginal utility of those remittances in period 2, in terms of income or consumption its
investment will produce in period 2. In terms of Figure 1, if φ∗ > 0 and the household invests some
of its remittances, the budget constraint may shift down to Bm from Bn on the vertical axis (period
1), but it shifts out in period 2 so that the household can consume on the higher indifference curve
ICm.
However, if the household does not invest any of its remittances (e.g. φ∗ = 0), then the
household is constrained to have a higher relative marginal utility of consumption in period 1 than
in period 2 at the optimum, because µ is positive. In terms of Figure 1, the budget constraint would
not shift down and right; it would shift up as the migrant left and investment was not planned. The
migrant would have a higher marginal product outside the household in period 1, and production
would revert back to the no migrant case in period 2. Even if the household did invest after
migrating, it would not be able to reach a higher indifference curve than ICN.
Equations (2) and (3) implicitly deﬁne optimal functions for migration (M∗) and the fraction
of remittances invested (φ∗). To understand the mechanism by which migration can relax a con-
straint on investment, it is useful to rearrange equation (3) as a function of the marginal product of












Equation (4) states that the household attempts to set the marginal product of capital fK in period
2 equal to the product of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, UC1/UC2, and relative
prices in period 1, 1/p2. If the household does not fully invest its remittances (φ∗ < 1), then the
shadow price of capital is zero (µ = 0) and the household is able to equate the marginal product of
capital in period 2 with its relative utility value in period 1. In other words, these results show the
manner in which it is possible that migration can act as a substitute for credit. In short, the migrant
household that wants to ﬁnance an investment is able to trade labor in period 1 (in the form of
migration) for capital in period 2.











Equation (5) suggests that in period one, the household equates the marginal product of labor
within the household with some function of the marginal product of migrant labor.
3.1 Extending the Model: Adding a Financial Constraint
Until now, our model has assumed that there are no alternative sources of credit and that all house-
holds have the same access to capital. However, as seen in the descriptive section above, there
are large regional differences in rural China regarding levels of wealth and access to credit. These
characteristics may have an important effect on whether or not a migrant household decides to
invest . For example, wealthy households are likely to have a high level of capital K, and if its
marginal product is diminishing, then equation (5) implies that households with a lower marginal
product of capital (fK) will have less reason to invest remittances than households with higher
marginal product of capital. If fK is low, then the investment of remittances φ∗ will be less at-
tractive, so the household will be more likely to simply consume remittances if they participate in
migration. Given the potential importance of the tradeoff between credit and migration for ﬁnanc-
ing investments, it seems compelling that we should allow explicitly for differences in wealth and
credit access among households.
To allow our model to relax the credit constraint on some households, we modify the model
to allow households to borrow money in order to invest. Consider the possibility that households
are able to borrow some amount B to invest in capital in period 1, and B plus interest (at rate i)




U(f(K,L − M;X) + (1 − φ)g(M;Z),
14Note, that we could also assume that borrowing also is the household’s own liquid assets, which are used at the
opportunity cost of the interest rate.
16p2f(K + B + φg(M;Z),L;X) − (1 + i)B)
s.t. 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1; B ≥ 0 (6)
Deﬁning λ as the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing non-negativity constraint, the ﬁrst-














where arguments are used for the marginal product of capital in order to differentiate periods 1 and
2. Equation (7) states that the household will borrow funds so long as sum of the marginal product
of capital in period 1, weighted by discounting and the price level, and the marginal product of
capital of period 2 are equal to the cost of capital i. If the cost of capital i is too high, then λ
is positive and the household can only add to its capital level through migration. If the cost of
capital is low and households can borrow, then they will be less likely to participate in migration to
ﬁnance investment. However, they may still send out migrants if the marginal product of labor in
period 1 is higher in migration than in household production. Therefore, in areas where borrowing
is possible, households will be able to ﬁnance investment without migration. Since migration may
still occur to reap higher consumption in period 1, we would expect to see a weaker link, or no link
at all, between migration and investment in areas where capital markets exist.
3.2 Testable Hypotheses
Our theoretical model leads to several hypotheses, three of which we will test in the next section.
However, we do not test one of the ﬁrst predictions from our model, that households sending out
migrants may suffer a loss in consumption or income when a migrant leaves (Figure 1). This
hypothesis is tested using these data in de Brauw (2002), who ﬁnds no evidence of a lost-labor
effect on income. It could be that households sending out migrants are able to substitute labor
for capital, either in the form of remittances, as predicted by the model, or as rental factors in its
agricultural production. Over time, rental factors have become increasingly available (Jacoby et
al., 2002), which makes it less surprising that household income is not signiﬁcantly affected by
migration.
17Above all, our model helps us formulate the main hypothesis of interest . Using the results of
our theoretical analysis, our ﬁrst testable hypothesis can be stated as: When there are no alternative
sources of credit, households that send out migrants expect that migrants will send or bring back
remittances to invest in the household’s stock of assets. In terms of the model, we can see that if
the optimal fraction of remittances invested (φ∗) is positive, migration should have a positive effect
on investment (equations (2) and (3)).
However, when we add borrowing or savings to the model (equations (6) and (7)), several
types of households may not need to use migration as a way ﬁnance investment. First, some
households are inherently relatively rich. Second, areas that have robust, local off-farm labor
markets tend to be wealthier (Mohapatra, 2001), and therefore households may not need to send
out migrants to ﬁnd off-farm employment. Finally, households that have access to alternative credit
sources may have lower marginal values of capital. In summary, households that are richer, can
ﬁnd employment locally, or have access to credit may be able to ﬁnance their own investment
without participation in migration. Since all three of these types of households tend to live in
richer areas, a second testable hypothesis that we can examine is: In richer areas, households will
be less inclined to participate in migration to ﬁnance investment. In contrast, we expect to see a
stronger link between migration and investment in poorer areas.
Beyond affecting the decision to invest or not, the wealth of an area also may affect the
type of investment, whether ﬁnanced through migration or not. If households face constraints on
their investments and choose to only make one type of investment (productive or consumptive),
the decision will depend on the relative marginal utility of each investment. Following this logic,
we have a third testable hypothesis: If productive investments in poor areas have lower expected
returns, we expect more consumptive investment.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
To examine the hypotheses, we specify an empirical model to estimate the effect of migration on
investment:
Wht = αh + ρWh,t−1 + ζMMh,t−1 + ζRRh,t−1 + ζZZht + εht (8)
18We specify the dependent variable is speciﬁed as cumulative investment in the current period t,
Wht. We seek to measure the effect of migration by including two household variables, one that
measures the number of migrants in the migrant labor force (Mh,t−1) and the other that is the
number of returned migrants in the household workforce (Rh,t−1) In order to better pick up the
timing between migration and investment, in the basic model we lag the migration variables by
one year.15
In our attempt to explain household current cumulative investment, we also need to control
for a number of other effects in equation (8). First, we include the lagged dependent variable,
Wh,t−1, to hold constant the effects of previous investments by households. We also control for a
vector of other time varying variables, Zht. In all of our empirical speciﬁcations, Zht includes the
size of the household workforce, which is measured as all members of the household between the
ages of 16 and 60, and the household land endowment.16 In order to isolate any life cycle effects
on cumulative investment, we also test using the experience level of the household head in some
speciﬁcations of the model.17 Finally, as discussed earlier we are concerned that when a household
considers ﬁnancing investment by sending out migrants or bringing back return migrants, the de-
cision may be affected by a number of unobservable factors at the household level and above. In
order to account for all non-time varying, supra-household effects, in all of our speciﬁcations we
include a household ﬁxed effect, αh.18
Unfortunately, we cannot simply estimate equation (8), because eliminating the ﬁxed effects
causes the estimate of ρ to be inconsistent with an asymptotic bias of the order 1/T (Hsiao, 2003).
When the ρ coefﬁcient is inconsistent, the β coefﬁcients on the migration variables are inconsistent
as well, since they help determine the previous period’s investment. To correct for the dynamic
endogeneity problem, we take two alternative approaches. First, we instrument the lagged invest-
15To test the robustness of our results to the length of the lag in the basic model, we performed sensitivity analysis,
using zero, two and three lags. Our main results are robust to the inclusion of the contemporaneous variables and
further lags.
16The land endowment is deﬁned as the land allocated to the household by the village, and it is measured in mu.
One mu is equivalent to about 1
15 of a hectare.
17We deﬁne the experience level as the number of years since the head ﬁnished his or her schooling. If the head of a
household is illiterate, we use the head’s age less six years, which corresponds with the suggestion of Mincer (1974).
18Descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables in the model can be found in Appendix Table 1.
19ment level, Wh,t−1, with a second lag of the variable, Wh,t−2. While this approach should help
reduce the bias in the coefﬁcients of interest, it has the drawback that the instrument may still
be correlated with the contemporaneous error term εht. Second, we employ the Anderson-Hsiao
(1981) technique of differencing equation (8) and instrumenting the differenced lagged investment
with the second lag of investment:
Wht − Wh,t−1 = ρ(Wh,t−1 − Wh,t−2) + ζM(Mh,t−1 − Mh,t−2) + (9)
ζR(Rh,t−1 − Rh,t−2) + ζZ(Zht − Zh,t−1) + (εht − εh,t−1)
To estimate equation (9), we use two stage least squares, using Wh,t−2 as an instrument, since ac-
cording to Anderson and Hsiao it will be uncorrelated with (εht−εh,t−1). Although this procedure
theoretically leads to a consistent estimate of ρ, estimates from the procedure have been shown
to be noisy relative to other estimators for similar speciﬁcations through Monte Carlo simulations
(Kiviet, 1995). Considering the strength and shortcomings of the two approaches, in our empirical
work below, we ﬁrst use both of the approaches and present the results. Since the estimated coefﬁ-
cients for our variables of interest do not vary when using alternative estimators, in the rest of the
paper we use the former approach, or the model that uses the level of investments.
4.1 Results
Since our descriptive results indicate that migration is more likely to affect consumptive than pro-
ductive investment, we begin our analysis by examining the effect of migration on consumptive
investment (Table 6). When we estimate equations (8) and (9) using the alternative estimation ap-
proaches, our model performs fairly well. The overall R2 of the ﬁrst model exceeds 0.80 (column
1). As expected, the signs on the coefﬁcients of the lagged dependent variables are all positive
and the t-ratios are large (row 1). Although the signs on the coefﬁcients of other control variables,
household workforce and land endowment, are not signiﬁcantly different than zero, it is possi-
ble that these variables have complicated relationships with investment and so the result is not
surprising.
20When we use the standard ﬁxed effects estimator (Table 6, column 1), we ﬁnd evidence in
support of our ﬁrst hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that when the household sends out an addi-
tional migrant, consumptive investment in the following period rises by 3004 yuan; when migrant
returns to the household investment increases by 4024 yuan. Both coefﬁcients are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. As discussed above, though, the coefﬁcients on the migration
variable may be asymptotically biased because of dynamic endogeneity.
To counter the endogeneity problem, we instrument the lagged investment variable with its
second lag and recompute the ﬁxed effects estimator (henceforth called the IV estimator; column
2). The results change somewhat, but there is still support of the hypothesis that migration affects
consumptive investment. The coefﬁcient on the number of migrants variable decreases to 2647,
but it is still statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, the results provide evidence that on average, across all
households in the sample migration appears to add to household consumptive investment. How-
ever, the effect of return migrants on investment disappears. The estimated coefﬁcient on the return
migrants variable both decreases and is no longer signiﬁcantly different from zero. Although the
descriptive statistics indicated that return migrant households had higher cumulative consumptive
investments than nonmigrant ones, when we attempt to control for dynamic endogeneity as well
as ﬁxed effects, the differences disappear and return migration does not appear to lead to higher
consumptive investment.
We perform two further checks on the robustness of the IV estimator. First, we use the
Anderson-Hsiao estimator in equation (9) (column 3). Although the t-ratios on the estimated coef-
ﬁcients of the migration variables are smaller, the estimated coefﬁcient on the number of migrants
variable (2646) is almost exactly the same as the estimate using the IV estimator (2647). As the
results are consistent across estimators, we prefer the IV estimator for the statistical reasons dis-
cussed above. Second, we add additional control variables to the basic IV speciﬁcation to hold
constant possible life cycle effects on investment (columns 4 and 5). We are concerned that a
household might systematically change its investment behavior over its life cycle, and the life
cycle might be correlated with opportunities for migration. The inclusion of life cycle variables
further reduces the magnitude of the estimated coefﬁcients on the migration variables, but overall
21the general result is consistent across speciﬁcations.
Taken as a whole, our results show that there is a positive relationship between migration and
consumptive investment that is consistent with the patterns suggested by the descriptive statistics.
Using the estimated effect of migration on investment in column 5, a household at the mean level
of consumptive investment in 2000 (14520 yuan), sending out a migrant would increase its con-
sumptive investment by 14.2 percent. Households that send out migrants seem to take advantage
of remittances and other intangibles sent home by migrants to improve their quality of life in the
source community.
Unlike consumptive investment, our analysis shows that migration has no effect on pro-
ductive investment (Table 7). Using the IV estimator and same the speciﬁcation that we used in
speciﬁcation 5 in Table 6, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on the number of migrant and return mi-
grant variables are not signiﬁcantly different from zero (column 1; rows 2 and 5). The results are
not surprising, since they are consistent with the descriptive statistics. As a whole, the results,
when compared to those for consumptive investments, provide evidence for our third hypothesis:
for some reason (e.g., the investment climate for business is less attractive in rural areas), when
households use migration to help ﬁnance investments, they decide to investment in housing and
consumer durables, and not in productive investments. Perhaps inﬂuenced heavily by the results
for productive investment, our analysis also shows that migration has no statistically signiﬁcant
effect on total investment.
When we divide our sample into households in rich and poor areas, our ﬁndings also provide
evidence in support of the second hypothesis (Table 7). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that neither migration
nor return migration has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on either consumptive or productive invest-
ment in rich areas (column 2). Given that households in richer areas can more easily self-ﬁnance
and that ﬁnancial intermediation is better developed in the richer areas, our results are reasonable.19
In contrast, in poor areas the number of migrants have positive and statistically signiﬁcant
effects on consumptive and total investment (column 3). If a household sends out an additional mi-
grant, the household experiences a 2374 yuan increase in consumptive investment and a 1605 yuan
19To examine the robustness of our results, we also estimated the models using alternative deﬁnitions of “rich” and
“poor” areas. The results were largely similar.
22increase in total investment. Return migrants, however, do not affect consumptive investments in
poor areas. Moreover, neither the number of migrants or the number of return migrants have a
statistically signiﬁcant effect on productive investment.
In gauging the size of the effects of migration on consumptive investment in poor areas,
we ﬁnd that they quantitatively important, since aggregate wealth levels are comparatively low in
poor areas. At the mean consumptive investment level in 2000 for poor areas (12420 yuan), an
additional migrant increases consumptive investment by 19 percent. More fundamentally, these
results also imply that households in poor areas, unlike those in rich areas, depend upon migrants
to ﬁnance investment. They also imply that although the business environment in or around the
source community is poor, households still want to invest and do so by using migration to invest in
housing or consumer durables to improve their living standards.
Our results differ with conclusions drawn by other authors who have studied the relationship
between migration and investment in rural China. Bai (2001) and Murphy (1999) use descriptive
analysis to posit a link between migration and investment. We ﬁnd that when we control for other
factors through the use of household ﬁxed effects, some of the dramatic differences between mean
investment levels in migrant and non-migrant households disappear. Zhao (2002) uses an ordinary
least squares estimator and a cross-sectional data to posit a positive relationship between return
migration and productive investment. However, due to the nature of her data she was unable to
hold unobservable heterogeneity at the household level constant. When we do so with household
ﬁxed effects, we ﬁnd no evidence of such a relationship.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we set out to understand how migration might affect investment using a data set
that covers much of rural China. Our ﬁrst objective was to describe how investment differs by
household migration status and location. In our descriptive statistics, we ﬁnd that investment is
rising, on average, at healthy rates throughout rural China. We also ﬁnd that migrant and return
migrant households have had higher investment levels between 1995 and 2000 than non-migrant
households. However, rural households appear to prefer to invest in consumptive investments
23rather than productive ones, particularly in poorer areas.
To understand and test for linkages between migration and investment, we ﬁrst present a
theoretical model. It generates a set of hypotheses that posit that households that participate in
migration will have higher investments, and that the relationships will be stronger for consumptive
investment and in poor areas. Accounting for heterogeneity among households by using an estima-
tor that includes controls for household level ﬁxed effects and dynamic endogeneity, we ﬁnd that
an additional out migrant leads to an increase in consumptive investment of about 2000 yuan. We
also ﬁnd that migration has a stronger effect on investment in poor areas than in rich areas. The
results are consistent with the idea that households in richer areas are better able to self-ﬁnance
investments or have better access to credit. In lieu of credit access, households in poorer areas must
turn to their labor to provide themselves with capital to invest. Furthermore, since households in
poor areas may lack productive investment opportunities, so they use money earned by migrants to
build houses or to purchase consumer durables.
The results in this paper have strong implications for China’s regulations that hinder pop-
ulation movement, especially the movement of migrants out of poor areas. Our paper provides
evidence that households participating in migration are better able to invest in housing and con-
sumer durables, and that the effects of migration are strongest in places that cannot be considered
well-off. Therefore, constraints that are placed on movement from rural areas may hinder house-
hold investment.
Our ﬁndings may also provide backing for proposals that seek to expand the provision of
credit to rural households in poorer areas. Unfortunately, we are not able to quantify the costs
that some households may have incurred when they sent out migrants to ﬁnance their investment.
If we could measure these costs, it is possible or even likely that they would outweigh the costs
associatedwithborrowingfromalocalﬁnancialinstitutions. Therefore, amoredevelopedﬁnancial
system could increase efﬁciency in rural economies.
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Shift in budget constraint from
participation in migration
Figure 1: Intertemporal Tradeoff in Consumption Facilitated by Migration
28Table 1: Average and Median Household Investment, by Type and Year
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Productive Investment
Mean 3669 8069 3887 5248 4667 9229
(7315) (32790) (6680) (18610) (13240) (43800)
Median 997 1334 1540 1219 1300 1500
Percent Investing 18.7 17.3 18.2 22.0 21.3 26.6
Consumptive Investment
Mean 16760 14300 9810 11330 11000 13170
(47900) (32170) (16580) (26930) (32800) (27100)
Median 3340 3003 3438 3048 2620 4525
Percent Investing 19.3 18.7 16.4 19.7 24.1 16.1
Total Investment
Mean 12227 12877 7890 9552 9117 12008
(38240) (37480) (13900) (25650) (27450) (40520)
Median 2250 2200 2925 2083 2300 2827
Percent Investing 32.1 31.6 29.3 35.4 40.0 38.0
Notes: This table includes the whole sample. All ﬁgures in year 2000 yuan. Figures in parentheses are
standard deviations. Means are conditional on investment taking place, and exclude any agricultural assets
or durables purchased for less than 500 yuan.
Source: Authors’ survey.
29Table 2: Average Cumulative Household Investment, by Type and Year
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Productive Investment
Mean 3669 7319 7786 8726 9482 12030
(7315) (26270) (24110) (25150) (25790) (37340)
Median 998 1578 2134 2467 2852 3302
Percent Investing 18.7 28.5 35.9 45.2 52.1 61.5
Consumptive Investment
Mean 16770 17690 17510 18830 20670 22600
(47900) (43410) (39680) (41570) (46350) (47580)
Median 3340 3700 4530 5130 6350 7890
Percent Investing 19.3 33.4 42.9 51.8 60 64.2
Total Investment
Mean 12230 16210 17480 19850 22470 26410
(38240) (42680) (42650) (49630) (55690) (66410)
Median 2250 3604 5132 6159 7691 8394
Percent Investing 32.1 49.3 59.0 69.0 77.2 83.0
Notes: This table only includes households for which the migration history is available. All ﬁgures in year
2000 yuan. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. Means are conditional on investment taking
place, and exclude any agricultural assets or durables purchased for less than 500 yuan.
30Table 3: Average Cumulative Total Investment in Rich and Poor Counties in China, 2000
All All Other
Category Provinces Zhejiang Provinces
All Counties 25300 50400 20300
(70000) (115100) (56100)
Richest Counties 48900 130100 30740
(128230) (223100) (87610)
All Other Counties 20600 30820 18030
(34100) (42000) (31950)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. All measures are the cumulative investment between 1995 and
2000, and exclude households that did not invest.
Source: Authors’ survey.
31Table 4: Percent of Workforce that are Migrants or Return Migrants, by Rich and Poor Areas, 1995
and 2000
All Households in Households in
Households Rich Areas Poor Areas
1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
Migrants 9.7 19.0 13.0 20.9 9.0 18.5
Return Migrants 4.9 9.1 7.9 11.9 4.1 8.4
Notes: Calculations are based on all surveyed individuals that were members of the household and working
in 1995 or 2000, respectively.Source: Authors’ survey.
32Table 5: Income and Investment Levels in Households, by Migration Status and by Rich and Poor
Areas
Per-Capita Consumptive Productive
Category Investment Investment Investment
Households in Rich Areas
Return Migrant 24360 15660 8685
Households (32280) (28220) (15290)
Migrant 24120 22340 1780
Households (45770) (45330) (5440)
Non-Migrant 14380 7480 6900
Households (25610) (12162) (22070)
Households in Poor Areas
Return Migrant 17510 12420 5096
Households (22890) (18560) (10360)
Migrant 16658 14880 3022
Households (29640) (31970) (7530)
Non-Migrant 13910 8870 5560
Households (23090) (16590) (15650)
Notes: All ﬁgures are expressed in yuan, and households above 200,000 yuan have been eliminated as
outliers. The category “households with out migrants” does not include households that also have return
migrants living in them. Standard deviations in parentheses. “Rich areas” include the richest county in all
provinces.
33Table 6: Effects of Previous Migration and Return Migration on Change in Cumulative Consump-
tive Investment
Speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged 0.57 0.80 1.29 0.76 0.76
Investment (33.95)** (14.07)** (2.50)** (12.29)** (12.27)**
Previous Out and Return Migration (lagged one period)
Number of 3056 2647 2646 2065 2073
Migrants (4.21)** (2.97)** (1.87)* (2.29)** (2.29)**
Number of 3950 1909 2408 774 784
Return Migrants (2.86)** (1.08) (0.91) (0.43) (0.44)
Other Controls
Household −169 −280 −392 −371 −390
Workforce (0.31) (0.41) (0.37) (0.54) (0.56)
Land −79.5 −108 −76.1 −61.9 −67.0
Endowment (mu) (0.36) (0.39) (0.18) (0.22) (0.24)




Notes: *- indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level; **- indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Household ﬁxed effects are included in each equation. Speciﬁcation (1) does not instrument the lagged
investment variable; speciﬁcations (2), (4), and (5) use the second lag of investment as an instrument for the
ﬁrst lag; and speciﬁcation (3) uses a differenced estimator with the second lag of investment as an instrument
for the differenced ﬁrst lag, as suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). Sample size in speciﬁcation (1) is
3050 and in all others is 2440.
34Table 7: Effects of Previous Migration and Return Migration on Change in Cumulative Investment,
by type of investment and by rich and poor
Investment All Households Households
Type Households in Rich Areas in Poor Areas
Effect of Migrants on:
Consumptive 2073 3468 2374
Investment (2.04)** (1.22) (3.18)**
Productive −133 1096 −178
Investment (0.13) (0.18) (0.50)
Total 1215 3795 1731
Investment (0.81) (0.48) (1.95)*
Effect of Return Migrants on:
Consumptive 784 333 1605
Investment (0.44) (0.04) (1.09)
Productive −2450 −1869 −746
Investment (0.21) (0.16) (1.01)
Total −2172 −1749 −269
Investment (0.72) (0.11) (0.15)
Notes: **- indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level. The same speciﬁcation is used as in column 5 of Ta-
ble 6. Household ﬁxed effects are included in each equation, and the lagged investment is instrumented with
the second lag of investment. Sample size is 2440; 488 observations are in rich areas and 1952 households
are in poor areas.




Return Migration 0.12 0.23
(0.35) (0.48)
Land Endowment 6.71 6.51
(6.54) (6.20)
Household Workforce 2.63 2.78
(1.05) (1.18)
Experience of Head 26.43 31.43
(12.60) (12.60)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ survey.
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